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Summary. The aim of the paper is to explore the link between agent’s heterogeneity
and indeterminacy in a general equilibrium economy. The framework is provided by the
two-sector growth model with technological externalities of Boldrin and Rustichini (1994)
in which heterogeneous agents are introduced. We first show that the occurrence of
indeterminacy depends on the distribution in labor endowments and in shares on initial
capital among the agents as well as on preferences and technology. We find that the
sign of the effect of heterogeneity on indeterminacy is not pinned down by the standard
properties of preferences, a fact that might be surprising in view of some recent results (as
in Herrendorf et al. (2000)). However, when risk aversion is a concave or a slightly convex
function, then heterogeneity is a factor that opposes the external effects in generating
indeterminacy.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there have been claims that the occurrence of indeterminacy in models with
externalities ”is overstated in representative agent models, as these ignore the poten-
tial stabilizing effect of heterogeneity” (Herrendorf et al (2000). This remark may seem
surprising from a standard general equilibrium viewpoint, as heterogeneity is usually a
source of complexity because it provides many additional degrees of freedom to the econ-
omy. On the other hand, it is also well known that aggregation of heterogeneous agents
may produce under certain circumstances an aggregate demand possessing some definite
properties (e.g., Grandmont (1992)). The aim of the present paper is to explore the link
between heterogeneity and indeterminacy in a general equilibrium model.
In the paper we show that heterogeneity may both favor or be opposed to indeterminacy
in economies with external effects. However, under some plausible conditions on risk
aversion, heterogeneity is a factor that tends to neutralize the externality as a source of
indeterminacy. The results are obtained within the framework of a general equilibrium
model of the type used by Bewley (1982) but with technological externalities. In order to
investigate the dynamic properties of the model, the technology is specified analytically
while preferences are kept general. In fact, the model we consider is similar to Boldrin and
Rustichini (1994). The major innovation is that we abandon the representative agent as-
sumption and admit non-linear utility functions. Agents may be heterogeneous in respect
to the share of the initial stock of capital and in labor endowments as well as in prefer-
ences. Due to the structure of the model, individual characteristics and heterogeneity do
not affect the steady state itself as far as aggregate variables are considered. However,
this model is sufficient to analyze the effects of heterogeneity on indeterminacy. Note
that the introduction of externalities in a model with heterogenous agents presents some
well known technical difficulties (see Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1990), Santos (1992) or
Ghiglino (2002)).
Heterogeneity has an effect on indeterminacy. However, the usual axioms on preferences
do not limit the sign of this effect. The reason is that this depends on the third and higher
order derivatives of the utility functions. Empirical data concerning these derivatives is
lacking. However, risk aversion is linked to the curvature of the utility function and
therefore to the advent of an indeterminate steady state. Data seems to indicate that risk
aversion is, at least, slightly decreasing. A condition on the first order derivative of risk
aversion is not enough to restrict the sign of the impact of heterogeneity on indeterminacy,
while its concavity or slight convexity are sufficient conditions ensuring that heterogeneity
is opposed to indeterminacy.
The tractability of the model is based on some strong simplifying assumptions. First, there
is only one consumption good and one capital good. Second, technology is restricted to
belong to some class as the production functions are analytically specified. Finally, labor
endowments are considered as exogenous parameters. The model may be used to describe
a variety of situations in which labor is provided inelastically. The first situation we
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have in mind is one in which the differences in labor endowments model taxes on current
income that are included in a redistribution policy. However, the present model may also
be used to gain intuition on the behavior of a more complex model in which labor supply
is endogenously determined. In this case differences in labor endowments are a shortcut
to model the differences in the disutilities that agents associate to labor. Heterogeneity
in labor could also reflect differences in the levels of productivity across agents.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyze the link between indetermi-
nacy and the redistribution of capital shares and labor endowments in a general equilib-
rium model with external effects. The scope of the present paper is similar to Herrendorf
et al. (2000) as both papers analyze the impact of heterogeneity on indeterminacy. How-
ever, the two frameworks are very different as Herrendorf et al. consider a continuous
time overlapping generations economy with exogenous prices (as in Matsuyama (1991),
an assumption that eliminates most of the the general equilibrium effects. Finally, in
that model agents differ in respect to their productivity. We adopt a general equilibrium
framework with fully flexible prices. Agents are infinitely lived. Heterogeneity is in terms
of the agents characteristics which are shares in initial capital, endowments in labor and
preferences. As a special case we will focus on heterogeneity in shares only. The present
paper is also related to Ghiglino and Sorger (2002). In that paper, indeterminacy is shown
to occur in a continuous time, endogenous growth model with externalities and heteroge-
neous agents. However, their analysis fail to qualify the effects of redistributions on the
occurrence of indeterminacy. Another weakness is that preferences are bound to be log-
linear. A version without externalities of the present model is also considered by Ghiglino
and Olszak-Duquenne (2001). In that paper it is shown that with no externalities the
distribution of labor endowments and capital shares matters in the stability properties of
the steady state. In the present paper we focus instead on the link between indeterminacy
and redistribution and highlight the role played by risk aversion.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the model is introduced while the equilibria
are defined in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the dynamics followed by the aggregate
variables near the steady state and local indeterminacy. In section 5 the occurrence of
indeterminacy in the model with heterogenous agents is analyzed. Finally, in Section 6
some sufficient conditions ensuring that heterogeneity reduces indeterminacy are obtained.
2 The model
In the present paper we consider a competitive two-sector economy with different types
of agents and technology externalities. Since we focus on dynamics, the model need
to be kept as tractable as possible. The technology is formalized as in Boldrin and
Rustichini (1994) but we introduce heterogeneity across agents. The externalities are
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of the labor-augmenting type as detailed below. There is no joint-production and firms
produce according to constant returns production functions so that at the optimum, profits
are zero. There are two produced goods, a consumption good and a capital good. The
consumption good cannot be used as capital so it is entirely consumed. The capital good
cannot be consumed. There are two inputs, capital and labor. We also suppose that there
is instantaneous capital depreciation and that labor is inelastically used in production.
There are two firms, one for each sector. The firm in the first sector produces a con-
sumption good with two inputs, capital and labor, according to a production function
that include externalities from capital, Fˆ 1(k1, l˜1, k). The externality is assumed to be a
labor-augmenting technological progress, i.e. Fˆ 1(k1, l˜1, k) = F 1(k1, kη l˜1). Let l1 = kη l˜1
be the ”effective” labor force and assume that F 1 is a Cobb-Douglas production function
then F 1(k1, l1) = (l1)α(k1)1−α with α ∈ (0, 1) where l1, k1 are the amount of capital and
”effective” labor used by the firm of the consumption sector.
In a decentralized economy, the firm maximizes profit
Max p1t F
1(k1t−1, l1t )− p2t−1k1t−1 − wtl1t
where p1t is the price of the consumption good at period t, p
2
t−1 is the price of the capital
good at period t− 1 and wt the price of labor at period t. The optimal production plan
satisfies the first order conditions
p1t
∂F 1
∂k
= p2t−1
p1t
∂F 1
∂l
= wt
In the second sector, the externality is also a labor-augmenting technological progress so
it can be treated as above. The representative firm produces a capital good according
to a Leontief function F 2(k2, l2) = Min (l2, k
2
γ ) with γ ∈ (0, 1). The optimal production
plan for this firm is then
l2t =
k2t−1
γ
There are three types of agents, a, b and c. There are Ni agents of type i, i = a, b, c.
The framework could be extended as to include any finite number of types. In each
period consumers provide inelastically a constant amount of labor ωi, i = a, b, c with
Naωa+Nbωb+Ncωc = 1. A model in which the amount of labor provided is endogenously
determined could be analyzed but at a much higher cost. At the beginning of the economy,
each agent i is endowed with a fixed share θi of the initial stock k−1 of capital, with
Naθa+Nbθb+Ncθc = 1. Consumer’s preferences are characterized by a discounted utility
function of the form
U i(xi) =
∞∑
t=0
δt ui(xit)
where xit is the consumption of agent i at time t and xi is its intertemporal consumption
stream. We assume δ > γ. The instantaneous utility function fulfills the Inada condition
lim
xit→0u
′(xit) = +∞.
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In a decentralized economy, an agent i maximizes his utility function subject to a single
budget constraint
∞∑
t=0
p1txit =
∞∑
t=0
wtωi + p2−1θik−1 with i = a, b, c.
3 Equilibria and steady states
In the present economy the first welfare theorem does not necessary hold. However, as was
recognized by Kehoe, Levine and Romer (1992), every competitive equilibrium obtained
in a decentralized economy is a Pseudo-Pareto optimum in the sense that is the solution to
the maximization of a social welfare function (see Ghiglino (2002) for some applications
of this approach). This function could be considered as the objective of a constrained
central planner. In the current section we first define competitive equilibria and then
characterize the set of Pseudo-Pareto optima.
3.1 The competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium can be defined as a sequence satisfying the following definition.
Note that, due to the form of the externality the total ”effective” labor at time t is the
product of the work force with kηt−1.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices (p1t , p
2
t , wt)
∞
t=0 with p
2−1 = 1
such that markets clear for every t ≥ 0:
• l1t +l2t= (N aωa+N bωb+N cωc)k ηt−1= k ηt−1
• k 1t +k 2t= F 2(k 2t−1, l2t )
• Naxat+N bxbt+N cxct= F 1(k 1t−1, l1t )
• k 1−1+k 2−1= k−1 with k−1 given
where
• (xit) is a solution to the individual maximization program of agent i, i = a, b, c for
(p1t , p
2
t , wt)
∞
t=0.
• (kjt , ljt ) is a solution to profit maximization for firm j, j = 1, 2 for (p1t , p2t , wt)∞t=0.
In the present model, competitive equilibria are Pseudo-Pareto optimal allocations, i.e.
solutions to the maximization of a ”social” welfare function (see example 2.1, Kehoe,
Levine and Romer (1992))
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3.2 The planner’s optimum
The Pseudo-Pareto optima are the set of solutions to the planner’s problem as (µa, µb)
spans [0, 1]× [0, 1] :
Max µaNa
∞∑
t=0
δt ua(xat) + µbNb
∞∑
t=0
δt ub(xbt) + (1− µa − µb)Nc
∞∑
t=0
δt uc(xct)
s.t. Naxat +Nbxbt +Ncxct = F 1(k1t−1, l1t ) for all t
k1t + k
2
t = F
2(k2t−1, l2t ) for all t
l1t + l
2
t = z
η
t for all t
k−1 given
together with the side condition zt = kt−1.
For the case with no externalities, i.e. η = 0, the solutions to the above program are inte-
rior as soon as ωi 6= 0 or θi 6= 0 for i = a, b, c. As shown in Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne
(2001) this is a consequence of the Inada conditions on preferences and technology.
Let u be a social utility function defined by
u(x) = Max µaNa ua(xa) + µbNbub(xb) + (1− µa − µb)Nc uc(xc)
s.t Naxa +Nbxb +Ncxc = x
Let T (k, y, z) be the usual transformation function defined as the solution to
Max F 1(k1, l1)
s.t. F 2(k2, l2) ≥ y
k1 + k2 = k
l1 + l2 = zη
Then the planner’s problem is seen to be equivalent to
Max
∞∑
t=0
δtu(T (kt−1, kt, zt))
s.t. F 2(kt−1, zηt ) ≥ kt
k−1 given
The solution depends on zt and k−1. However, there is still the side condition zt =
kt−1. With the specification of production adopted through the paper the transformation
function can be written as
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T (k, y, z) = (zη − y)α(k − γ y)1−α
In the sequel we use the return function V : R+ ×R+ ×R+ → R defined by
V (k, y, z) = u(T (k, y, z))
The function V is concave in (k, y), because u and T are concave.
3.3 The Euler conditions
Using the return function V (k, y, z) the maximization program can be written as
Max
∞∑
t=0
δt V (kt, kt+1, zt+1)
s.t. (kt, kt+1) ∈ Dt
k−1 given
Side condition: zt = kt−1.
where Dt is the set {(kt, kt+1)|F 2(kt, zηt ) ≥ kt+1} . Let V1(k, y, z) = ∂V (k, y, z)∂k and
V2(k, y, z) =
∂V (k, y, z)
∂y
.
In the present framework it is a standard result that the set of interior Pareto optima are
the set of {kt}t that satisfies the transversality condition limt−→∞ δtV1(kt, kt+1, kt)kt = 0
and are solutions to the system
V2(kt, kt+1, kt) + δV1(kt+1, kt+2, kt+1) = 0 ∀t
3.4 Steady state in the capital good
At a steady state, kt = k∗ for every t ≥ 0. The capital k∗ is implicitly defined by the
equation
V2(k∗, k∗, k∗) + δV1(k∗, k∗, k∗) = 0
In models with a unique consumption sector, aggregate steady state variables depend only
on the technology. Indeed, using the definition of the return function, the Euler condition
can be written as
T2(k∗, k∗, k∗) + δT1(k∗, k∗, k∗) = 0
where T1(x, y, z) =
∂T (x, y, z)
∂x
and T2(x, y, z) =
∂T (x, y, z)
∂y
.
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With the specification of production used in the present paper
T1(k∗, k∗, k∗) = (1− α)
(
k∗η−1 − 1
1− γ
)α
T2(k∗, k∗, k∗) = −
(
k∗η−1 − 1
1− γ
)(α−1) [
α+ γ(1− α)(k
∗η−1 − 1
1− γ )
]
Some easy calculations gives the steady state capital as a function of the discount factor
and the technology parameters only
k∗ =
[
(1− α)(γ − δ)
γ − α− δ(1− α)
] 1
1−η
In the present paper, total labor supply is normalized to one. It is easy to see that in
general k∗ represents the steady state capital normalized by the total labor supply. On
the other hand, the aggregate consumption x∗ can also be obtained
x∗ = T (k∗, k∗, k∗) = k∗(k∗η−1 − 1)α(1− γ)1−α
3.5 The steady state in individual consumptions.
At the steady state, aggregate capital depends on the total labor supply only. Indeed,
as it does not depend on the return function the welfare weights are irrelevant, and both
preferences and the way endowments are distributed among individuals do not matter.
In more general models this is not true. In particular, when there are two consumption
goods the steady state values of aggregate consumption depend on the individual welfare
weights and therefore on the heterogeneity in preferences and endowments.
As opposed to aggregate variables, the steady state values of individual consumption do
depend on individual characteristics through the welfare weights (note that at a steady
state these are easy to compute). The exact relationship is provided by the following
Lemma.
Lemma 1 At a steady state k∗ the individual demands are{
xi∗ =
x∗
1− γ [ (δ(1− α) + α− γ)ωi + (1− δ)(1− α)θi ]
where x∗ = k∗(k∗η−1 − 1)α(1− γ)1−α.
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Proof: The first order conditions associated to the individual program are{
δtu′i(xit) = νip1t ∀t, i = a, b∑∞
t=0 p
1
txit =
∑∞
t=0wtωi + θik−1
where νi is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constrained maximization problem.
At a steady state xit = x∗i and p1t = δtp10 where p10 is the price of the consumption good
in period 0. The budget constraint, together with the conditions on profit maximization,
imply
x∗i =
1− δ
p10
( ∞∑
t=0
wtωi + θik−1
)
= ωi
∂F 1
∂l
(k∗1, l∗1) + (1− δ)θik−1∂F
1
∂k
(k∗1, l∗1)
The values of k∗1 and l∗1 are obtained by solving the system{
l∗1 + l∗2 = k∗
η
k∗1 + k∗2 = k∗ = F 2(k∗2, l∗2)
and using the fact that at the optimum l∗2 =
k∗2
γ
. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 implies that for given technology parameters and discount factor, steady state
values in individual consumptions depend linearly on initial holdings in capital and labor
endowments. This also means that there is a linear manifold of (θi, ωi)i=a,b,c associated to
each equilibrium allocation.
4 Aggregate dynamics
In the present general equilibrium model the reduced social utility function depends on the
welfare weights. Furthermore, these weights depend on the equilibrium allocations which
in turn depend on the initial conditions and on the distribution of individual endowments.
When the welfare weights are continuous functions of the initial conditions, the dynamic
and determinacy properties of the general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents
and those of the reduced model are identical. Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001) have
shown that when there are no externalities, continuity holds and the local dynamic and
determinacy properties of the general equilibrium model are obtained from the properties
of the planner’s problem with the welfare weights fixed at the values associated to the
steady state. Because of the externality the continuity property cannot be assumed here.
However, it will be seen that the analysis of indeterminacy can be pursued to a large
extent without this strong property. The relationship between the dynamic properties
of the equilibrium path in the aggregate variables and the properties of the social utility
function are first established. The use of these results in obtaining the properties of the
disaggregated model is left for the next section.
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4.1 The role of social risk aversion
Near the steady state the behavior of the dynamic system is equivalent to the behavior of
the linearized system. The dynamic properties of the steady state are then related to the
eigenvalues of the matrix associated to the linearized system. In particular, the stability
and the local determinacy properties of the steady state depends on how the modulus of
the eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 compare to one.
Let the function f be defined by
f(kt, kt+1, kt+2) = V2(kt, kt+1, kt) + δV1(kt+1, kt+2, kt+1).
The Euler equation
V2(kt, kt+1, kt) + δV1(kt+1, kt+2, kt+1) = 0
can be linearized at the steady state (k∗, k∗, k∗) to give
∂f
∂kt+2
(k∗, k∗, k∗)(kt+2 − k∗) + ∂f∂kt+1 (k
∗, k∗, k∗)(kt+1 − k∗) + ∂f∂kt (k
∗, k∗, k∗)(kt − k∗) = 0
This equation describes the dynamic behavior of {kt}t near k∗. The resolution of the
characteristic equation
∂f
∂kt+2
(k∗, k∗, k∗)p2 + ∂f
∂kt+1
(k∗, k∗, k∗)p+ ∂f
∂kt
(k∗, k∗, k∗) = 0 (CE)
for p gives the eigenvalues associated to the dynamical system. As there is only one
consumption good, for a given technology and aggregate labor the steady state value of
aggregate capital is uniquely determined and does not depend on the characteristics of the
consumers. However, the stability properties of the steady state do depend on the social
utility function and therefore on the individual characteristics. The following notion need
to be introduced.
Definition 2 Let u be the social utility function, u : R+ → R, and R(x) the risk aversion,
R(x) = −u
′′(x)
u′(x)
. Let ρ be the inverse of the risk aversion, ρ = − 1
R
=
u′(x)
u′′(x)
.
Note that ρ is negative and that ρ close to zero indicates a very high degree of curvature
of the utility function.
For a given externality, discount factor and technology parameters, the eigenvalues depend
on the inverse of the risk aversion of the social utility function, ρ, through the equality
V (k, y, z) = u(T (k, y, z)). Indeed, we have the following result.
Lemma 2 The eigenvalues associated to the dynamic system expressed in terms of the
inverse of risk aversion ρ are
p1,2 =
1
2
[ −B ±√B2 − 4C ]
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with
B =
ρ(T22 + δ(T11 + T13)) + δT1((1 + δ)T1 + T3)
δ(−δT 21 + ρT12)
C =
1
δ
[
1 +
−δT1T3 + ρT23
−δT 21 + ρT12
]
where Tij = Tij(k∗, k∗, k∗), i, j = 1, 2, 3 are the second order derivatives of T.
Proof: The eigenvalues, which are the solutions of the characteristic equation (CE), are
given by
p1,2 =
1
2
[ −B ±√B2 − 4C ]
with B = (
∂f
∂kt+1
|
k∗
)(
∂f
∂kt+2
|
k∗
)−1 and C = ( ∂f
∂kt
|
k∗
)(
∂f
∂kt+2
|
k∗
)−1
Let Vij =
∂2V
∂ki∂kj
(k∗, k∗, k∗). The definition of f implies that
∂f
∂kt+2
|k∗ = δV12, ∂f∂kt+1 |k∗ = δ(V11 + V13) + V22 and
∂f
∂kt
|k∗ = V12 + V23
and then B =
δ(V11 + V13) + V22
δV12
and C =
V12 + V13
δV12
(1).
At the steady state and for i, j = 1, 2, 3, V (k, y, z) = u(T (k, y, z)) implies that
Vij(k∗, k∗, k∗) = u′′(T (k∗, k∗, k∗))TiTj + u′(T (k∗, k∗, k∗))Tij
=⇒ Vij(k
∗, k∗, k∗))
u′′(T (k∗, k∗, k∗))
= TiTj +
u′(T (k∗, k∗, k∗))
u′′(T (k∗, k∗, k∗))
Tij = TiTj + ρTij (2).
Expressions (1) and (2) and the Euler equation T2 = −δT1 lead to the announced values
for B and C. Q.E.D.
The result of Lemma 2 is represented in Fig. 1 where p1 is the eigenvalue with the smallest
modulus, i.e. | p1 |<| p2 |.
INSERT Fig. 1 HERE
A property which plays an important role in the subsequent developments is that at most
one of the two graphs p1(ρ) and p2(ρ) intersect the horizontal line drawn at −1. This is
a consequence of the fact that the branches of pi(ρ) are monotonous as shown in Fig. 1.
As the stability and determinacy is linked to the modulus of the eigenvalues (with 1 as
the critical value), the previous fact implies that only three cases are feasible:
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Case A Neither p1 nor p2 intersect the line p = −1. The steady state is always determinate
and stable whatever the value of ρ.
Case B The eigenvalue p1 intersects the line p = −1 while p2 < −1. Stability and instability
are possible but indeterminacy is ruled out.
Case C The eigenvalue p2 intersects the line p = −1 while 1 > p1 > −1. Both (determinate)
stability and indeterminacy are possible.
These remarks lead to the following statement:
Corollary 1 For any given set of admissible parameters (α, γ, η, δ), there exists a value
of the risk aversion of the social utility function, R0, such that for all economies with a
higher curvature, R > R0, the steady state of the reduced model is stable and determinate.
The graph pi(ρ) is a representation of one member of a family of functions. The two
families, i = 1 and i = 2, are obtained when the quadruples (α, γ, η, δ) span the set
of feasible values. A change in one of the parameters is likely to modify the graph so
that different cases for (determinate) stability and indeterminacy of the steady state arise
depending on the quadruple (α, γ, η, δ). A complete analysis would require to know how
these graphs are shifted and modified when the parameters change. The dependance is
complex and the effects of each one of the parameters are hardly separable.
The following lemma gives sufficient conditions on the parameters for the existence of a
(negative) solution ρc to the equation pi = −1 for i = 1 or i = 2. In other words it gives
open sets of technology parameters and time discount factor such that changes in the
curvature may bring a change in the dynamic behavior of the economy (case B) or/and
in determinacy (case C).
Lemma 3 (i) If
1
3
< α <
1
2
; γ > 1− 2α ; η > η = 2α + γ − 1
1− γ
or
α >
1
2
; γ < 1− α ; η > η
then there exists δ such that for all δ in Iδ =] δ, 1 [, there exists ρc < 0 such that p2(ρc) =
−1. There is indeterminacy for ρ < ρc and determinate stability otherwise (case C) .
(ii) If
α <
1
3
and γ ∈
 α(1− 2α)√
(1− α)2 + (1− 2α)2 , α

or
11
1
3
< α <
1
2
and γ ∈
 α(1− 2α)√
(1− α)2 + (1− 2α)2 , 1− 2α

then there exist δc and δcc in ] 0, 1 [ such that for all δ in Iδc =] δc, δcc [, there exists ρc < 0
such that p1(ρc) = −1 or p2(ρc) = −1 (cases B or C).
Proof : See the appendix.
Remark: The conditions given for (i) are necessary and sufficient while those for (ii) are
only sufficient (see the proof for details).
Lemma 3 is illustrated by some numerical examples.
Case A No negative solution. Let α = 0.3 and γ = 0.12 < γ = 0.1488. Then ρc = 2.2145 >
0.
Case B A solution to p1 = −1. Let α = 0.15, γ = 0.13 and η = 0.1. Then Iδc =
]0.1857, 0.2973[. For δ = 0.2, ρc = −18.84. When ρ −→ −∞, p1 −→ −1.25
and p2 −→ −3.48.
Case C A solution to p2 = −1. Let α = 0.7, γ = 0.2 and η = 0.8. Then Iδ =]9259, 1[.
For δ = 0.95, ρc = −0.3736. Then, when ρ −→ −∞, p1 −→ −0.1278 and p2 −→
−0.8471.
Lemma 3 will be applied to the dynamics of the disaggregate economy in Section 5 and
Section 6.
4.2 Turnpike properties
Lemma 3 concerns the dynamic properties of the steady state when the technology, the
welfare weights (or the individual preferences and endowments) and the time discount
factor are fixed parameters. A classical result concerns the asymptotic stability properties
when the time discount tends to zero, i.e. δ −→ 1.
Lemma 4
i) If α <
1
2
and γ < 1 − 2α then for given technology, preferences and initial endow-
ments there exists δs < 1 such that the steady state is stable for δs < δ < 1.
ii) If α and γ satisfy the hypothesis (i) of Lemma 3, then there exists a value η = η
such that:
• if η < η =⇒ there exists δs such that the steady state is stable for all δ > δs.
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• if η > η =⇒ the stability and determinacy can be influenced by the curvature
of the social utility function for all δ > δ, with δ defined in Lemma 3.
iii) If α >
1
2
and γ > 1 − α, there exists δs such that the steady state is stable for all
δ > δs.
Proof: A straightforward application of Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Remark: For a weak externality the steady state always becomes stable as δ −→ 1. This
result does not hold for a sufficiently strong externality.
In general equilibrium convex models the limit point depends on the distribution of initial
capital and labor, even when the turnpike property holds. However, Yano (1984, 1991,
1998) shows that the sensitivity to the initial capital shares tends to disappear as the time
discount factor δ approaches one. A similar result concerning the steady states holds in
the present model. Note that the limit points concerning the individual consumptions
depend on the individual endowment in labor.
Lemma 5 When δ is sufficiently close to one the steady states associated to different
distributions of individual holdings of initial capital lie in a neighborhood of k∗ = (1 −
α)
1
1−η and this neighborhood shrinks as δ → 1. Similarly, the individual steady state
consumptions lie close to
x∗i= αα[(1 − α)(1 − γ)]1−αωi
Proof: From Lemma 1 with straightforward calculations.
When agents differ only in respect to their shares in the initial capital, as the discount
factor tend to one their individual consumptions converge to a common value. On the
other hand, for a given discount their relative distance is given by
x∗i − x∗j
x∗
=
(1− α)(1− δ)
(1− γ) (θi − θj)
5 Indeterminacy in the heterogenous agents econ-
omy
The aim of this section is to prove local indeterminacy in the heterogeneous agents econ-
omy under scrutiny. The analysis of the previous section relates the dynamic behavior of
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the aggregate variables to the curvature of the social utility function, the time discount
factor and the technology parameters. Heterogeneity across consumers affects the welfare
weights and then the social utility function. Therefore, determinacy and stability of the
aggregate steady state are expected to depend on the heterogeneity. Finally, indeter-
minacy of the solutions to the planner’s problem implies that there exist disaggregate
economies with indeterminate competitive equilibria.
Proposition 1 There exists open sets of parameters α, γ, η, δ and open sets of prefer-
ences such that local indeterminacy around the competitive steady state occurs for some
distributions of initial endowments or capital shares but not for others. The result holds
also if the agents have identical preferences and labor endowments.
Proof: i) In the appendix it is shown that the value of the curvature at the steady state
is given by
ρ(θa, θb, θc,ωa, ωb, ωc) = Na
u′a
u′′a
(x∗a(θa, ωa)) +Nb
u′b
u′′b
(x∗b(θb, ωb)) +Nc
u′c
u′′c
(x∗c(θc, ωc))
Without loss of generality, we may assume that preferences are identical so that the
subscripts can be dropped and that Na = Nb = Nc = 1.
ii) Assume that the coefficients α, γ and η satisfy the assumption in case (i) of Lemma
3, and let δ be in Iδ. According to Lemma 3, these assumptions imply that ρc < 0 and
that indeterminacy for the reduced model occurs for any ρI < ρc.
Since there are no structural constraints on the first and second derivatives of the indi-
vidual utility function, except the usual sign conditions, the previous expression implies
that ρI can be obtained with a suitable choice of preferences. Furthermore, since ρ(θ, ω)
depends on the derivatives of the individual utility functions evaluated at different points,
the result still holds when the preferences for all agents are identical.
Indeterminacy in the aggregate dynamics imply indeterminacy in the disaggregated model
with heterogenous agents. Indeed, given the aggregate initial stock k−1 and the welfare
weights (µa, µb) there is a continuum of paths (kt)∞t=0 converging to the steady state. For
each of these paths, the first order condition associated to
Max µa ua(xat) + µb ub(xbt) + (1− µa − µb) uc(xct)
s.t xat + xbt + xct = T (kt−1, kt,kt−1)
gives the individual consumption allocations (xat)∞t=0, (xbt)∞t=0 and (xct)∞t=0. Finally, (θa, θb)
is obtained from the individual budget constraint and the values of the prices and the
wages. Due to the indeterminacy there is an open interval of feasible (θa, θb) with the
same k−1 and (µa, µb). On the other hand, in a neighborhood of the steady state, a
small perturbation of the welfare weights will only slightly affect the path (kt)∞t=0. Due to
the continuity of the functions involved and the fact that prices converge to the steady
state price, the interval of feasible (θa, θb) is also only slightly affected. Therefore, there
is an open set of (θa, θb) such that for each element in this set there is a continuum of
equilibrium paths. Therefore the steady state is indeterminate in the individual variables.
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iii) As in ii) assume that the parameters fulfill the conditions stated in i) of Lemma
3. Consider now a redistribution of initial capital shares such that all agents becomes
identical. The economy trivially admits a representative agent. In this situation, for
any ρs > ρc the steady state is stable (and determinate). Since, there are no structural
constraints on the first and second order derivatives of the individual utility function,
except the usual sign conditions, the preferences chosen in i) can be perturbed as to
satisfy also ρ = ρs.
Q.E.D.
In Proposition 1, preferences are not bound to belong to some specific class. In particular,
if preferences are assumed to be CES then the derivatives of all orders are given functions
and the proof fails. However, it can still be shown that the result holds in this case,
the argument being similar to Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2001) (for the details see
Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2000)).
It should be pointed out that Proposition 1 does not concern the effects of all redistribu-
tions of initial endowments on dynamics and determinacy. Indeed, this would require to
be able to decide whether the steady state of the general disaggregated model is deter-
minate or indeterminate, a much harder task. When the welfare weights are continuous
functions of the initial conditions, the local dynamic properties of the general equilibrium
model are indeed equivalent to the dynamic properties of the aggregate ”optimal growth”
model with the welfare weights fixed at the steady state values. There might be conditions
ensuring that such strong continuity properties also hold in the present model but we do
not have a formal proof.
6 When heterogeneity works against indeterminacy
Heterogeneity is one of the main macroeconomic indicators of the microeconomic structure
of the economy. Our aim in this section is to link indeterminacy to heterogeneity. There
are several difficulties. The first is that heterogeneity is a concept that is not uniquely
defined. When agents have identical preferences, a good indicator of heterogeneity is the
spread of initial endowments in capital shares and labor. If we furthermore assume that
only shares in initial capital (or labor endowments) differ, the agents can be distributed
on the real line. An homogeneous economy is then an economy that has a distribution
of shares (or labor endowments) picked around some value, while in an heterogenous
economy these are widely spread. This notion agrees with the definition of heterogeneity
given in Herrendorf et al. (2000), Definition 3. In the present model, there are three types
of agents, so that an heterogeneous economy has an equal number of agents of each type,
while an homogeneous economy has mostly all agents of the same type.
That heterogeneity so defined may have an effect on indeterminacy is a consequence of
Proposition 1. In fact this link is expected to hold under general conditions (see Corollary
1). However, it may also be seen that the usual axioms on preferences don’t limit the sign
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of the effect. The reason is that the occurrence of indeterminacy depends on the third and
other high order derivatives of the utility functions. Standard assumptions on preferences
do not put any limitation on these and empirical data is also lacking. However, these
higher order derivatives are linked to risk aversion. And the properties of risk aversion
are better known from an empirical point of view.
Several results can be obtained. When relative risk aversion is equal across individuals and
constant, i.e., when preferences are identical across individuals and CES, heterogeneity
is shown to play no role on indeterminacy or instability. When risk aversion is a strictly
concave function, homogeneity is a source of indeterminacy or instability. When risk
aversion is a strictly convex function homogeneity is still a source of indeterminacy or
instability, provided the second derivative of risk aversion is sufficiently small. As data is
compatible with concave or slightly convex risk aversion, one may think that in realistic
models heterogeneity may help to restore determinacy in economies with external effects.
This agrees and extend the results in Herrendorf et al. (2000).
Proposition 2 Assume that agents are characterized by identical preferences with risk
aversion R(x). If R(x) is a strictly concave function, then homogeneity is a source of
indeterminacy or instability. The same result hold if risk aversion is a strictly convex
function with 2R′2(x)/R(x) > R′′(x), while if the latter inequality is reversed, heterogeneity
becomes a source of indeterminacy or instability. Finally, if the parameters α, γ, η, δ
satisfy the conditions in Lemma 3 (i), then all the results above concern indeterminacy
(and not instability).
Proof: Assume that preferences and labor endowments are identical across consumers,
ua(x) = ub(x) = uc(x) = v(x) and ωa = ωb = ωc = ω. The proof of Proposition 1
shows that the reaction of the curvature of the social utility function to a change in
individual consumption depends on the inverses of the individual risk aversion. Corollary
1, and the discussion therein, show that in order to analyze the effect of heterogeneity
on indeterminacy or instability it is sufficient to compare two stylized situations: 1) The
economy is homogenous, there is one agent of each type, Na = Nb = Nc = 1; and 2)
there is only one type of consumer, i.e. Nb = 3. The exact value of the individual capital
shares is irrelevant for the proof, as long as x∗a(θa, ω) < x∗b(θb, ω) < x∗c(θc, ω). We take
θa = 1/6, θb = 2/6 and θc = 3/6. Consequently, we need to compare
ρhe =
v′
v′′
(x∗(1/6, ω)) + v
′
v′′
(x∗(2/6, ω)) + v
′
v′′
(x∗(3/6, ω))
with
ρho = 3
v′
v′′
(x∗(1/3, ω))
Three cases need to be analyzed depending on the properties of risk aversion.
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(i) When preferences are identical across consumers and risk aversion is constant, Rj(x) =
R so that v′(xj)/v′′(xj) = −1/R, the effect on the parameter ρ is additive and weighted
by the number of consumers. In this case, there is no impact on either stability or
determinacy of the steady state and heterogeneity is neutral.
(ii) Assume that preferences are such that risk aversion is a concave function over the
relevant range. Since (v′(x)/v′′(x))′ = (−1/R(x))′ = −(R2(x))−1R′(x) we obtain
(v′(x)/v′′(x))′′ = (−(R2(x))−1R′(x))′ = 2(R3(x))−1(R′(x))2 + (−(R2(x))−1R′′(x)) > 0
i.e., a strictly convex function. In this case,
ρho < ρhe < 0
and indeterminacy is more likely in the homogenous economy then in the heterogenous
economy.
(iii) Assume instead that risk aversion is a convex function over the relevant range. In this
case, provided |2(R3(x))−1(R′(x))2| < |−(R2(x))−1R′′(x)| or 2(R(x))−1(R′(x))2 < R′′(x),
we obtain
(v′(x)/v′′(x))′′ = 2(R3(x))−1(R′(x))2 + (−(R2(x))−1R′′(x)) < 0
i.e., a strictly concave function. As a conclusion,
ρhe < ρho < 0
and indeterminacy is more likely in the heterogenous economy. On the other hand, if
2(R(x))−1(R′(x))2 > |R′′(x)| then indeterminacy is more likely in the homogenous econ-
omy.
Finally, if the parameters satisfy the conditions in Lemma 3 (i) then the steady state is in-
determinate for any sufficiently small social curvature. In this case, the results obtained so
far are related to indeterminacy.
Q.E.D.
The above results are consistent with the view that the importance of indeterminacy in
models with externalities are overstated in the literature. Indeed, we have found plausible
circumstances for which heterogeneity is a factor that tends to neutralize the externality
as a source of indeterminacy. It should be pointed out that in our model, heterogeneity
in individual productivity are not explicitly taken into account. However, as we allow for
heterogeneity in labor endowments, our model can be reinterpreted as to include different
levels of individual labor productivity.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 3: Existence of the roots
First, remark that p1 = −1 and p2 = −1 are satisfied simultaneously only if p1 =−B +√B2 − 4C
2
= p2 =
−B −√B2 − 4C
2
= −1 (the choice of the sign depends on
the convention | p1 |<| p2 |). This implies √B2 − 4C = B − 2 = 0 and C = 1. This is a
non generic situation.
Now, p1,2 = −1 ⇔ ±√B2 − 4C = −(B − 2). This implies B − C = 1. Using Lemma 2
which gives the values of B and C in terms of ρ, we obtain
B − C = 1⇔ (T22 − T12 − T23 + δ(T11 + T13))ρ+ δT1(δT1 + 2T1 + 2T3)
δ(ρT12 + T1T2)
= 1
Solving for ρ gives the solution
ρc =
−2δT1(T1(1 + δ) + T3)
T22 − T12 − T23 + δ(T11 + T13 − T12)
Some tedious calculations show that
ρc = αδx∗
Q(δ)
f(δ)
(∗)
with
Q(δ) = δ(1− α)(1 + η) + (1− α) + η(α− γ)
f(δ) = aδ2 + bδ + c
and 
a = (1− α)(1− 2α)(1 + η)
b = −[α(1− η)(1− 2α) + γ(1 + η)(2− 3α)]
c = γ[γ(1 + η) + α(1− η)]
The value ρc is an acceptable solution for the equation pi = −1 provided it is strictly
negative (as it is the ratio of the first derivative u′ and the second derivative u′′ evaluated
at the steady state).
As the numerator is always strictly positive, f(δ) need to be negative. Since, the concavity
of f plays a role in the proof, the two cases α <
1
2
and α >
1
2
should be treated separately.
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Case A: α <
1
2
In this case, f is convex, with a > 0, b < 0 and c > 0 implying that f(0) > 0. There are
2 possibilities to obtain f(δ) < 0.
• Existence of an interval included in ]0, 1[ on which f is negative. The sufficient
conditions are a positive discriminant for f with roots between 0 and 1. As the
analysis is tedious, we give conditions on the parameters such that: f(1) > 0, the
critical point of f is positive and the product of the roots lies between 0 and 1.
These properties are sufficient to prove the result.
• Existence of a value δ in ]0, 1[ such that f(δ) < 0 on ]δ, 1[. This requires a positive
discriminant and f(1) < 0.
a) Sign of the discriminant ∆ of f
∆ can be considered as a polynomial function of degree 2 in η:
∆(η) = a′η2 + b′η + c′
with: 
a′ = [γ(1− α)− (α− γ)(1− 2α)]2 + 4γ(1− α)(1− 2α)(α− γ)
b′ = 2[γ2((1− α)2 + (1− 2α))2 − α2(1− 2α2)]
c′ = (1− 2α)2(α+ γ)2 + (1− α)2γ2)
If (and only if) all the coefficients are positive then the function ∆(η) is positive for all
values of η. a′ is clearly positive under the assumption α < 1
2
. b′ is positive only if
γ >
α(1− 2α)√
(1− α)2 + (1− 2α)2 = γ. As γ < 1 − 2α the ratio
γ
1− 2α is always smaller than
1. Finally, c′ is always positive for all value of α and γ. Under these assumptions, the
discriminant ∆ being positive for all values of η, there exist two roots δc and δcc.
b) Position of the roots δc and δcc in relation with the interval ] 0, 1 [.
Since the critical point − b
2a
is positive, f is convex and f(0) > 0.both roots are positive.
In order to find their position relative to 1, the sign of f(1) as well as the value of the
product of the roots δcδcc need to be analyzed.
b.1) Sign of f(1)
By definition, f(1) = (1− 2α− γ)[η(1− γ) + 1− 2α− γ]. Then f(1) is positive if:
• (1−2α−γ) > 0 and η(1−γ)+1−2α−γ > 0, which is equivalent to 1−2α−γ > 0
giving 1− 2α > γ.
• (1− 2α− γ) < 0 and η(1− γ) + 1− 2α− γ < 0, which is equivalent to 1− 2α < γ
and η < −1− 2α− γ
1− γ := η. However, as γ < α. the first condition implies α >
1
3
.
The f(1) is negative if:
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γ > 1− 2α (implying α > 1
3
) and η > η.
The results regarding f(1) can be reorganized as:
• If 0 < α < 1
3
then α < 1− 2α, so that γ < α < 1− 2α
⇒ f(1) > 0
• If 1
3
< α <
1
2
, two possibilities arise:
(i) γ < 1− 2α ⇒ f(1) > 0
(ii) 1 − 2α < γ < α: the sign of f(1) depends on the externality: f(1) is positive
for η < η and negative for η > η
b.2) Study of the product δcδcc
The product of the roots δcδcc is equal to
c
a
. Then the following relation holds:
c
a
< 1⇐⇒ η > γ(α+ γ)− (1− α)(1− 2α)
γ(α− γ) + (1− α)(1− 2α) = η˜
When γ < 1 − 2α, the numerator of η˜ is negative while the denominator is positive, so
that η˜ is negative. As η is
a value between 0 and 1, the assertion η > η˜ is always true, and δcδcc =
c
a
< 1.
When γ > 1 − 2α, we have that γ > γ (as γ < 1 − 2α) and α > 1
3
(because of the
assumption
γ < α). Here as γ > 1− 2α we always have η˜ > η.
The externality plays a crucial role and is necessary to choose η > η to obtain f(1) < 0.
As seen
before, the existence of δc and δcc in ]0, 1[ still requires η > η˜. However, as γ > 1−2α we
always have η˜ > η. Therefore the conditions η > η˜ and η < η can never be satisfied
simultaneously.
b.3) Conclusion for the case α <
1
2
There are three possibilities:
(i) δc and δcc smaller than 1: true if f(1) > 0 and δcδcc < 1.
(ii) δc < 1 and δcc > 1: true if f(1) < 0.
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(iii) δc and δcc larger than 1: true if f(1) > 0 and δcδcc > 1.
Then we obtain:
• Proof of lemma 3 (ii): When γ < 1−2α (here 0 < α < 1
2
) we have that f(1) > 0
and that δcδcc < 1. Then there exist δc and δcc are in ] 0, 1 [. Therefore, there exist
an interval in ]0, 1[ on which ρc is negative (the first set of conditions in Lemma 3
(ii) are due to the fact that the assumption γ < α is binding for α <
1
3
).
• Proof of Lemma 3(i), first set of conditions): When γ > 1−2α the externality
must be chosen larger than η in order to have a negative solution ρc in which case it
exists δ in ]0, 1[ such that f(δ) > 0 on ]δ, 1[. Otherwise, ρc is strictly positive. Note
that η is smaller than 1 under the previous assumptions.
Case B: α >
1
2
(Proof of Lemma 3(ii), second set of conditions)
In this case, f is a concave function with f(0) > 0. This is sufficient to prove the existence
of the roots δc and δcc. Let δ be the unique positive root. If f(1) is negative then δ is in
]0, 1[. First, note that α larger than
1
2
implies 2α+ γ − 1 > 0. Then, from the expression
for f(1) given above, f(1) < 0 for η >
2α+ γ − 1
1− γ = η. Finally, η is smaller than 1 only
if γ < 1− α.
Q.E.D.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 3: Identification of the roots
Since for ρ → −∞ both eigenvalues are negative, B is clearly positive. Then, the con-
vention | p1 |<| p2 | implies p1 = −B +
√
B2 − 4C
2
and p2 =
−B −√B2 − 4C
2
. From the
fact that the graph of p1 is upward sloping as ρ → −∞ (and inversely for p2) it follows
that
lim
ρ→−∞ p1 < −1⇐⇒ limρ→−∞
√
B2 − 4C < lim
ρ→−∞B − 2
lim
ρ→−∞ p2 > −1⇐⇒ limρ→−∞−
√
B2 − 4C > lim
ρ→−∞B − 2
If lim
ρ→−∞B−2 is negative then limρ→−∞ p1 > −1 and any solution ρc is a solution to p2 = −1.
Similarly, if lim
ρ→−∞B − 2 > 0 then limρ→−∞ p2 < −1, and ρc is a solution to p1 = −1.
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Study of lim
ρ→−∞B − 2
The limit can be considered as a function of δ, all others parameters (α, γ, η) being
fixed (indeed, the eigenvalues pi are functions of ρ members of a family generated by the
parameter δ). Using the definition we obtain,
lim
ρ→−∞B − 2 =
T11
α2δT12
g(δ)
with g(δ) = (1− α)(1− 3α− αη)δ2 + (α2 − γ(1− 2α)− ηα(α− γ))δ + γ2.
As T11 and T12 are both negative, we focus the analysis on the sign of g(δ) on ]0, 1[. As we
are only concerned by δ’s such that the solution ρcexists, we assume that the conditions
of Lemma 3 (i) are satisfied, i.e. δ in Iδ1.
Let g(δ) = aδ2 + bδ + c, with c strictly positive. Clearly, g(δ) is not strictly negative on
the interval ]0, 1[ because c > 0.
Two cases need to be considered depending on whether g is concave or convex. This
property depends on the sign of the coefficient a. We have:
a > 0⇐⇒ η < 1− 3α
α
= ηa
It is easy to see that if α <
1
4
then ηa > 1 and η < ηa. Consequently, a is strictly positive,
∀η, and g is convex.
If α ∈
]1
4
,
1
3
[
and η < ηa, then a > 0.
Finally, if α >
1
3
, a < 0, ∀ η, because ηa is negative.
Consider first α >
1
3
together with the others conditions given in Lemma 3(i). As g is
concave, the sign of g(1) need be analyzed. We have
g(1) = (2α+ γ − 1)2 − α(1− γ)η
The sign of g(1) can be expressed in term of η:
• g(1) > 0 =⇒ η < η˜
• g(1) < 0 =⇒ η > η˜
On the other hand, the conditions of Lemma 3 (i) imply an externality η larger than η.
It is easy to verify that under the assumptions of Lemma 3 (i), we have η˜ < η implying
g(1) < 0.
Therefore, when α >
1
3
the function g is negative on an interval ]δg, 1[, with δg > 0. On
the other hand, Lemma 3 (i) imply the existence of δ such that ρc is negative for all δ in
]δ, 1[. It can be shown that δ is larger than δg. Therefore, the assumption of the existence
of ρc implies then g(δ) < 0, for all δ in Iδ.
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To conclude, under the assumption α >
1
3
, the eigenvalue p2 will then be larger than -1
when ρ tends to infinity. Therefore, there is indeterminacy for ρ < ρc.
Consider now the conditions given in Lemma 3 (ii). A detailed characterization of all the
possible cases is feasible, but tedious. Instead, we give numerical examples showing that
both cases can occur within the feasible range of parameters.
For α <
1
4
, as seen before, the coefficient a is positive, so g is convex. Let α = 0.2 and
γ = 0.16. Then for η = 0.1, the function g is strictly positive on Iδc, while it is strictly
negative if η = 0.9. Therefore both cases can arise, but the second case needs a sufficiently
high externality, which depends on α and γ.
For α between
1
4
and
1
3
, the sign of a varies with the externality. For α = 0.3 and γ = 0.2,
g(δ) > 0 if η = 0.1, but g(δ) < 0 for η = 0.5 on Iδ.
Finally, for α >
1
3
and γ < 1− 2α, the function g can also be either positive or negative:
for α = 0.35, γ = 0.2 and η = 0.1, g(δ) is positive, while it is negative for η = 0.5. Again,
it is the increase in η that shifts the graphs of p1and p2 upward (from case B to case C).
Q.E.D.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 1 (i).
The social utility function is defined by
u(x) =Max µaNa ua(xa) + µb ubNb(xb) + (1− µa − µb)Nc uc((x−Naxa +Nbxb)/Nc)
The first and second order derivatives of the social utility function can be related to
the derivatives of the individual utility function of the agents. Indeed, the first order
conditions associated to the maximization problem that define the social utility function
give
Ψ1(xa, xb, x;µa, µb) = µaNa u′a(xa)− (1− µa − µb)Na u′c((x−Naxa +Nbxb)/Nc) = 0
Ψ2(xa, xb, x;µa, µb) = µbNb u′b(xb)− (1− µa − µb)Nb u′c((x−Naxa +Nbxb)/Nc) = 0
Then the following expressions are easily obtained
u′(x) = (1− µa − µb) u′c((x−Naxa +Nbxb)/Nc) = µaNa u′a(xa)
u′′(x) = µaNa u′′a(xa)∂xa∂x
where x represents the aggregate consumption. The implicit function theorem applied to
Ψ allows to express xa as a function of x near the steady state (x∗a, x∗b , x∗). In matrix form
we can write, (
∂xa
∂x
∂xb
∂x
)
=
 ∂Ψ1∂xa ∂Ψ1∂xb
∂Ψ2
∂xa
∂Ψ2
∂xb
−1 ( ∂Ψ1∂x
∂Ψ2
∂x
)
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Some straightforward computations give
x′a(x∗) =
∂x∗a
∂x
=
µcµbu′′b (x∗b)u′′c (x∗c)
µaµbNcu′′a(x∗a)u′′a(x∗a) + µaµcNbu′′a(x∗a)u′′c (x∗c) + µbµcNau′′b (x∗b)u′′b (x∗b)
where µc = 1− µa − µa.
The result then follows from the definition of ρ. Q.E.D
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